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Abstract Aggregate stocks of major grains declined to
minimal feasible levels in 2007–2008, due to high global
income growth and biofuel mandates. Given these minimal
stocks, prices were very sensitive to shocks, such as the
Australian drought, and biofuel demand boosts due to the
oil price spike. The effects of these shocks were magnified
by a sequence of trade restrictions by key exporters to
protect vulnerable consumers. Beginning in the ‘thin’
global rice market in the fall of 2007, these turned market
anxiety into panic. Recognizing the unreliability of imports,
vulnerable countries, including some in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA), are now considering investing
in strategic reserves, pursuing self sufficiency and acquiring
foreign land to ensure grain supplies for domestic con-
sumption. The associated expense and negative incentive
effects on national reserves may be acceptable if they have
quantitative targets related to the needs of the most vulnerable,
for distribution only in emergencies. In many MENA
countries, heavy subsidies on grain consumption for both rich
and poor reduce the stabilizing response of consumption to
price, and increase reserves needed to ensure food security.
Accumulation of stocks is a more efficient strategy than
pursuit of self-sufficiency in most MENA countries, as they
have no comparative advantage in expanding agriculture,
given restricted water supplies. Acquisition of foreign lands
leaves food supplies exposed to sovereign risk and other
supply chain problems beyond importers’ control. MENA
countries could cooperate and so smooth much of the risk
posed by fluctuations in their own harvests.
Keywords Grain reserves . Food security . Middle East
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Introduction
The price increases of many consumption commodities during
2007–2008, including the major grains, shocked consumers
and governments in many regions. The prospect of continuing
high grain market volatility is particularly threatening to
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) given
their high levels of cereal consumption and heavy dependence
on imports (World Bank 2009). Up to 35% of the region’s
calorie consumption is from wheat, and the region is
collectively a net importer of 58.1 million tonnes of cereal,
making it the largest net importing region in the world. Import
dependence is projected to increase from 56% in 2000 to 63%
in 2030, leaving the region even more vulnerable to high and
volatile international market prices.
Urban consumers, alarmed by the market turmoil
concerning their staple foods, participated in protests, often
violent, that peaked at about the time world grain prices
peaked in mid-2008. Some demonstrations threatened to
destabilize their governments (e.g. Slayton 2009), and in
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response, many nations adopted short-term policies to
reduce the effects of rising world prices on domestic
consumers. Though perhaps rational within each country, the
collective effects of these policies exacerbated international
price volatility, and often penalized the domestic farmers and
traders whose supplies to the market prevented more serious
shortages. To make matters worse, importers’ concerns about
food market access were heightened by news that key rice
exporters were discussing an export cartel, and that Argenti-
na’s proposal to tax wheat exports had disrupted that country’s
role as a key exporter. Many importers, including some
MENA countries (e.g. Morocco and Saudi Arabia) exacerbat-
ed competition for scarce imports by removing tariffs or
subsidizing imports of grains (Hater 2008).
Grain prices have receded significantly since 2008, but
remain more volatile than earlier in the decade, and food
security remains a major policy problem in the MENA region.
The policy focus has switched from short-term tactics for
crisis management to strategies to manage the effects of
market fluctuations on consumers at acceptable cost. Increas-
ing grain reserves has figured prominently in international
discussions, with proposals made for international reserves
combined with what advocates describe as ‘virtual reserves’
controlled via commodity futures and options trading. Special
regional emergency reserves have been proposed for countries
concerned about possible lack of access to the global trade.
Some observers have recommended regulation of commodity
futures trading by non-commercial investors, while Ethiopia is
supporting the establishment of a new futures exchange as part
of their grain market policy (Jopson and Blas 2008). Many
have pressed for reducing subsidies or mandates for biofuel
production on the grounds that such policies threaten food
markets’ stability. Several MENA countries (and others)
have taken steps to secure land in Africa and elsewhere to
produce grains to augment domestic supplies.
In this context, the main objective of this paper is to
provide government officials, representatives of civil
society, and officials of international organizations involved
in food security with an overview of the potential roles and
problems associated with using physical storage and related
policies as means of enhancing food security. The paper
discusses how MENA countries can use storage to address
their food security related needs and challenges; it shows
how properly managed storage can effectively integrate
international trade and other domestic policies in achieving
acceptable food security. In particular, the paper concludes
that storage can and should be used to reduce the risks of
food shortages. This avoids the unsustainable costs associ-
ated with self-sufficiency in food production by countries
with limited agricultural potential due to water scarcity and
other resource constraints, while also mitigating effects of
volatile international grain markets. The paper puts into
perspective the many options currently discussed by
MENA policy makers, who rightly consider their citizens’
food security an important national goal. The paper should
help countries to achieve greater food security by illumi-
nating the costs and benefits of the alternatives.
Strategy and policy options for enhanced food security
What is the evidence on aggregate food price behavior?
Aggregate food price has been less variable over recent years
than many of its components, particularly food grains.1 In
2005 the FAO food price index (Fig. 1) showed a modestly
rising trend 20% higher than the 1998–2000 average. Prices
accelerated in 2006, and by October were climbing sharply
until the summer of 2008, when the index exceeded twice its
2005 level; by late summer, it had fallen far from the peak,
but remained much higher than in 2000. However, this
aggregate food price index understates the price fluctuations
of the major food grains that attracted most attention.
For a longer view, the real price of wheat in the USA
trended downward for decades (Fig. 2), reflecting yields that
generally outpaced demand growth. Along their downward
paths, prices generally fluctuate moderately within a reason-
ably defined range. However, episodes of steeply rising prices,
followed by precipitous falls, are prominent features. The
price series are asymmetric, there being no equally prominent
troughs to match spikes, and when the price is relatively low
the probability of a sudden fall is negligible. These features
are characteristic of commodities generally and, relative to
other spikes in the figures, those of recent years are not
particularly high, when properly deflated.
The overall downward trend in prices is principally due
to the remarkable success of plant breeders and farmers in
continually developing and adopting new crop varieties
with increased yields, and to the development of cheap and
plentiful supplies of fertilizers and other inputs.
Increases in world consumption of the major grains have
occurred even as the scope for expanding cultivated area
has greatly diminished in most countries (Fig. 3). Note also
the recent surge in diversion of maize to biofuel uses.
These aggregate figures mask great regional variation in
prices and consumption, but the globalization of markets
and reduction in shipping costs offer great opportunities for
smoothing local fluctuations. Figure 4 shows wheat
1 Although we focus on aggregate numbers, it is important to note that
they mask large variation between countries, due to trade barriers,
domestic price and tax policies, and transport costs. As trade barriers,
tariffs and transport costs have changed abruptly, the scope of various
international markets has also been redefined. Furthermore, consumers
in large or landlocked countries often face widely varying prices. For
many, the international prices and global policies discussed here might
have little relevance (see De Hoyos and Medvedev 2009).
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production in individual countries and in the whole MENA
region. Pooling the entire regional output variation and
sharing it proportionally would considerably stabilize wheat
supplies, especially for Morocco, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and
Tunisia. However, they would still need to import large
portions of their grain supplies to feed their populations.
The increased demand for grain for human consumption
has been driven mainly by increased global population,
although the rate of increase has begun to slow. Only in
poorer countries is increased income an important driver of
grain consumption per capita, which is naturally limited by
human stomach capacity. For grains used for animal feed,
the trend towards increased consumption has been greater,
because human consumption of animal products continues
to rise with income long after minimum calorie require-
ments are satisfied. Use of maize as an animal feed has
boosted its demand beyond the expectations based on its
use as a human staple. Animal feed accounts for a smaller
but significant share of wheat production, notably in
Europe. Rice is used predominantly as a food. There is
substantial agreement about the drivers of these long-term
trends in grain consumption and prices; however, opinions
differ on the causes of recent grain price volatility.
What caused recent grain price fluctuations?
A consensus is emerging among economists concerning the
contributions of different factors to the recent market
volatility for grains. Predictable disturbances can cause
price trends, but not spikes, unless normal market responses
are somehow constrained2—spikes are generated by sur-
prises. Thus, the recent rapid increases in income in China
and India have increased global demand for food and feed
grains, but these increases, sustained for several years, were
only surprising in their continuation into 2008. Similarly,
reductions in the rate of yield increases in rice and wheat
could have contributed to a tighter market, but as medium-
term phenomena related to global neglect of crop research,
they were hardly surprises. For detailed discussions see
Abbott et al. (2008, 2009), Mitchell (2008), Timmer (2008)
and Gilbert (2008). Factors such as the unprecedented
extension of the Australian drought, other regional produc-
tion problems, the possible effects of global warming, and
exchange rate movements were much less predictable.
However, their influence was not sufficient to explain most
price spikes of 2007–2008.
Other market disturbances, which it was not possible to
predict before 2007, were global in influence and deserve
particular attention: the changes in biofuel policies and
demand, and price spikes of fertilizers and fuel. As all relate
directly to recent price spikes in the petroleum market, they
merit special consideration by a regional group which
includes many of the world’s major petroleum exporters.
Biofuel demand
The conversion of oilseeds into biodiesel in Europe, the USA
and elsewhere; of sugar into ethanol in Brazil; and of maize
into ethanol in the USA, link events in the world energy
markets to food market behavior in a qualitatively new way.3
In the USA, the diversion of maize and soybean to
biofuel approaches 30% and 20%, respectively. This will
further increase under current policies using subsidies and
2 The large increase in crude oil price in 2008, for example, was
predicted by the huge contango in the futures market, but lack of
storage capacity precluded the inter-temporal arbitrage that would
normally smooth the price response.
3 Though Brazil is a major biofuel producer (using sugar cane), its
production has apparently not diverted large areas from grain
production. Recent sugar market volatility, however, has focused
attention on the food market implications of Brazilian reliance on the
sugar-derived ethanol.
Fig. 1 FAO food price index
(1990–2009). Source: FAO.
Note the deflated food price
index is calculated by deflating
the FAO monthly food price
index using the monthly US
CPI, and then normalized such
that 2002–2004=100
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mandates, as well as protection from competition from more
efficient Brazilian sugar-derived ethanol. The southern corn
leaf blight infestation of 1971 cut maize supply in the USA by
only half the percentage currently diverted to biofuels;
however, it was a very serious shock that directed attention
to the USA’s food security. Furthermore, the mandates for
diversion of US maize for biofuel are expected to increase and
havemuchmore serious implications for supplies of maize for
feed and food than an equivalent yield drop due to blight
which was controlled relatively quickly by substituting
genotypes that were resistant.
As existing government mandates for the use of grains,
sugar and oilseeds were viewed as solid policy commit-
ments, strong biofuel demand was clearly foreseeable by
2006—before prices took off. However, unanticipated oil
price jumps must have encouraged upward revisions in the
expected growth of biofuel-related demand for grains and
oilseeds, as did upward revisions in the mandates in the
USA. Furthermore, the diversions were too great to be
made up in the short run by increased yields. They must
have had large effects on the decreases in grain stocks, and
the steady price increases in the years immediately
preceding 2007–2008.
Wheat and other food grains were diverted to animal
feed to substitute for maize diverted to ethanol and oilseeds
diverted to biodiesel. Consumers increased rice demand, to
replace the wheat used for feed. Biofuel demands and
surges in meat demand caused by rising incomes also
affected food grain markets less directly by diverting inputs
from food grains toward feed and biofuel. Some rice land
may have been diverted to produce maize or soybean, but it
is unlikely this greatly affected overall rice production. The
best rice land is ill-suited to corn or soybean in the
temperate zones where much of the world’s maize and
soybean are grown. However, on Asian croplands where
two or three crops are possible annually, wheat can replace
Fig. 2 Real price of wheat in
the USA (1950–2009)
Fig. 3 Global consumption of
grains. Source World Bank
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rice as a dry-season, irrigated crop when its relative price
increases.
Prices of fertilizers and fuels
Worldwide adoption of modern high-yielding plant varieties
and lower opportunities for expansion of cultivated area has
increased fertilizer demand. Prices of some fertilizers rose
faster than any other agricultural commodity price in 2007–
2008, reflecting short-term supply constraints, energy costs
and transport costs. Although some farmers and ethanol
producers have blamed fertilizer and oil prices for grain price
spikes, the evidence is not convincing. Grain price rises
associated with previous harvests preceded fertilizer price
movements, not vice versa.
Crude oil is an important input into modern agriculture,
both directly and indirectly. Its price is virtually independent
of disturbances in the grain markets. Crude oil prices have
been very high recently, but there was no large effect on
acreage or yield even in countries that use petroleum
intensively in production. Farm prices in the USA rose
dramatically as grain, fuel and fertilizer prices rose, indicating
the net effect on farmers’ profits and incentives was positive
and large. In contrast, unpredictable changes in petroleum
prices affected grain demand, since jumps in petroleum prices
now not only affect farmers’ costs, but also shift demand for
the grain they produce via increased biofuel demand. This is a
new phenomenon. When ethanol production exceeds man-
dated levels, marginal fuel price changes increase total
demand for grains even as they increase input costs.
Pursuing this line of argument, a reasonable expectation
might be that income growth and biofuel demand should
have less influence on the price volatility of rice relative to
maize and wheat. Yet the price spike was the highest for
rice in 2008, indicating another significant contributor to
chaos in the world grain markets—panic in the rice trade.
Panic in vulnerable markets
On 9 October 2007, the Indian Government banned exports of
rice other than basmati, and increased rice availability to its
consumers to reduce their concerns about inflation, and the
adequacy of staple food supplies after a poor wheat harvest.
The rice price outside of India began to rise (Fig. 5)—a
problem with wheat supply thus triggered a sequence of
decisions by other major exporters leading to the crisis in
rice prices and market access (Slayton 2009).
As reports of production problems in other countries
proliferated, governments of grain exporting countries were
pressured by their urban consumers to reduce grain prices.
These pressures temporarily outweighed the interests of
producers and traders in selling to the highest bidder. One
by one, rice exporters imposed their own export restric-
tions, including in March 2008, Viet Nam, an important
supplier.4 China, itself adequately supplied, did not make
its substantial grain stocks internationally available as a
supplier of last resort, as it had done earlier in the decade.
Instead it taxed wheat and rice exports. Other countries also
imposed export controls or taxes on wheat or maize
4 Viet Nam announced a ban on new sales in July 2007 (Slayton
2009).
Fig. 4 Wheat production in the
MENA region (million tonnes,
1979–2009). For each series,
figure in parentheses shows
coefficient of variation (after
de-trending) of deviations from
linear trend. Quantities relative
to entire MENA region are
shown on right axis
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exports; e.g. Argentina, South Africa, and the MENA
countries, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen (World Bank 2009;
Yemtsov 2008).
Countries dependent on imports of staple foods became
increasingly anxious to secure supplies. Ultimately, only
Thailand and the USA remained in the market as exporters.
Many countries, including Morocco, Saudi Arabia, India
and China, reduced their tariffs or taxes on imports, which
reduced domestic prices relative to world prices, but also
contributed to increasing world prices. One discouraging
example of inadequate international cooperation was the
failure to negotiate timely sale of Japanese rice stocks
(imported to comply with WTO mandates, and never
destined for domestic consumption) to desperate interna-
tional importers (Timmer 2008).
This episode highlighted the strong substitution, at the
margin, between the three major grains. Indeed, the market
for the major grains can be considered as a market for grain
calories (Bobenrieth and Wright 2009),5 and so reliance of
MENA countries on wheat is no insulation from disturban-
ces in other grain markets. They must recognize that shocks
in demand for maize for biofuels, for example, will have a
relative impact on international wheat prices and availabil-
ity comparable to the impacts on the maize markets.
Following the causal chain further, OPEC-induced shocks
to oil supply will likely affect the wheat import markets of
OPEC countries.
Reviews of grain price volatility during recent years
have allocated percentage shares of responsibility to a set of
factors—a sensible approach if these factors had a linear
cumulative effect on food price volatility; however, the
effect is highly nonlinear. When supplies are already tight,
another unexpected small supply reduction or new market
order can become the ‘straw that breaks the camel’s back’
and cause a sharp price spike. This nonlinearity merits
attention, as it is a key to understanding recent market
events and constructing appropriate policy responses.
The economics of storage arbitrage determines the highly
nonlinear relationship between grain prices and available
supply, and aids evaluation of claims that other factors are the
key drivers of market volatility. To understand the nonlinear-
ity of the price–supply relationship, it is necessary to grasp
some fundamental features of grain storage as an economic
activity. The theoretical models separate demand for con-
sumption from implicit demand for storage, under specific
assumptions on the competitive structure of the storage
industry. Once the inter-temporal price smoothing potential
ensured by storage management is understood, policy analysts
may be better able to value the alternative policy interventions
to increase the effectiveness of storage management in
enhancing food security.
The economics of storage
The effects of storage on the consumption and price of
grains are illustrated in Fig. 6. The annual harvest in year t,
ht, is random, reflecting the influences of weather and other
disturbances on production. Total demand is the horizontal
sum of the demand for consumption in the current period,
ct; and the demand for grain stocks, xt, to carry forward for
later consumption.6 Consumption responds to price accord-
ing to the downward-sloped market demand function P(ct).
Stocks xt cannot be negative.
In storage arbitrage, regardless of the economic setting
(monopoly, competition, state control of resource alloca-
tions), two accounting relations hold: available supply, At,
Fig. 5 Thai rice price and the
Indian export ban. Indicative
price based on weekly surveys
of export transactions,
government standard fob
Bangkok. Source: World Bank
Development Prospects Group,
and Mitchell (2008)
5 Roberts and Schlenker (2009) go further, and include soybean as a
fourth source of aggregate calories.
6 Essential working stocks and deterioration of stocks, which do not
change as prices change, are ignored here.
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is the sum of the harvest, ht, and stocks carried in from the
previous year, xt; and consumption is the difference
between available supply and the stocks carried out.
Profit-maximizing storage units hold positive stocks only
if they expect returns to cover costs. If storage units are
competitive, the current price of a unit stored must be
expected to rise at a rate that covers the cost of storage and
the interest charge on the value of the unit stored.
Given available supply, At, storage units carry stocks xt
from year t to year t+1 following a version of ‘buy low, sell
high’. Where the consumption demand is a downward
sloping straight line (e.g. Fig. 6), if the price is sufficiently
high, carried-over stocks are zero. When the price is high
and no stocks remain, those who consume grains (e.g. rice,
wheat or maize) as staples are willing to forego other
expenditures (including health and education) to continue
to eat their grain, so the consumption demand is very steep
and price inelastic. Large changes in price result as
consumption adjusts to the full effects of a supply shock;
e.g. in 1972–1973, a reduction in world wheat production
of <2%, when stocks were almost negligible, caused the
annual price to more than double (Fig. 2). When stocks are
high, a similar supply shock would have a far smaller effect
on price (Fig. 6).
By acquiring stocks when the price is low, storage units
can reduce the rise in consumption and thus cushion the
associated fall in price. The disposal of stocks when
supplies become scarcer reduces the severity of price
spikes. If the supply of speculative capital is sufficient,
storage can eliminate negative price spikes, but can smooth
positive spikes only as long as stocks are available. When
stocks run out, aggregate use must match a virtually fixed
supply in the short term. Less grain goes to feed animals
and the poorest consumers reduce their calorie consump-
tion, resulting in malnutrition, hunger or even death.
If producers can respond to incentives with a one-year
lag, that response is very stabilizing for consumption and
price. If, for example, an irrigation system which has been
shut down to save scarce ‘fossil’ water can be maintained in
usable condition, it could be an emergency production
reserve to stabilize consumption during severe shortage,
without the high capital cost of holding emergency stocks
to ensure a similar level of security.
In such markets, measuring both consumption and stocks
(including stocks held by consumers) is very difficult (thus
grain statistics refer to ‘disappearance’ rather than con-
sumption), and complicates food policy directed at ensuring
minimum consumption for all during shortages. Also, a
common feature of all such physical storage activities is
that, from a global viewpoint, aggregate stocks are con-
strained to be non-negative (even if there are conditions by
which further release of stock would be profitable, because
if current stocks are zero, it is impossible to ‘borrow from
the future’). This fact makes modeling storage behavior
particularly challenging, and thus estimating market behav-
ior based on available data is very difficult.7
How global storage affects world grain markets
To interpret the behavior of grain market prices, and
identify the causes of high volatility, it is crucial to
Fig. 6 The role of stocks in
buffering shocks
7 For estimates of storage and consumption behavior in markets for
some major commodities see Cafiero et al. (2009).
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understand how storage behavior affects the relation
between prices and available supplies of grain. The series
of annual stocks-to-use ratios and annual real price indexes
for wheat, reveals that the wheat price spikes in the 1970s,
1995–1996, and in 2007–2008 occurred when world stock-
to-use ratios were low (Fig. 7). For the market to function
effectively, a virtually irreducible minimum amount of
grain must be held in the system, to transport, market and
process grains. For example, no matter how urgent the
present demand for grain, some must be held on docks
during ship loading/unloading, and elsewhere in the supply
chain. Stocks data are notoriously imprecise, and minimum
working stocks are about 20% of use.8 Comparison of two
series (Fig. 7) shows that stocks are very unresponsive to
price at these minimum levels. A similar comparison for
maize would reveal the same phenomenon—spikes in price
when stock-to-use ratios were low.
Another important feature of these grains is that the
marginal cost of storage per period, including physical
protection, insurance and spoilage, is usually modest. The
assumption of constant unit costs is reasonable and a good
approximation in regions where humidity is low, modern
infrastructure is available, and deterioration unimportant,
but not in many hot and humid environments (Paul 1970).
The main cost of storing grains is usually the cost of capital
invested in accumulating stocks. Increases in grain stocks
are not generally limited by storage capacity. The storage of
grain is profitable only if the value of the grain when
released exceeds the sum of the storage cost and interest on
the capital.
Why public policies are needed to achieve optimal grain
supplies
In modern capitalist economies, an undistorted free market
might be expected to equate the value of grain used for
current consumption with the value of grain stored for the
future (placed in storage). However, there are two serious
problems with total reliance on private storage for national
food supplies: in a free market, only those with necessary
resources or ‘entitlements’ can acquire food, and the
destitute may starve with no affect on prices; and in a food
emergency, as experienced in many countries in 2008, there
is a tendency to identify scapegoats for high prices or
scarce supplies. Governments are pressured by politically
powerful consumers to force traders who have accumulated
grain to surrender stocks to the government or directly to
consumers, often without compensation, and/or to limit
‘speculation’ in grain markets. Sometimes these so-called
‘hoarders’ are also penalized. At such times, it is often
forgotten that if the next crop fails, the ‘hoarders’might be the
sole source of supply, and speculators the key source of funds
for investment. In the USA for example, long-run speculators
whose futures positions provide the incentive for storage by
short-hedgers, are currently the subject of much criticism,
despite lack of evidence of excessive stocks.
Anticipation of such treatment discourages private
storage in times of plenty, for distribution at a high price
in time of need. Government commitments not to confiscate
stocks (or otherwise penalize hoarders) in emergencies are
not credible. Hence, governments often choose to supple-
ment private storage with publicly acquired stocks or
storage subsidies (and even if the government manages all
market stocks, consumers inevitably store some domestic
supplies). When public stocks are released to consumers
they will have some negative effect on prices (although
targeted food distribution programs to those with no money
at all have minimal impact on market equilibria). Anticipa-
tion of this price effect reduces private storage incentives.
Hence, it is natural to expect that governments will
intervene actively when supplies are plentiful to increase
grain stocks and ensure supplies for the needy and/or
stabilize the market (Wright and Williams 1982; Williams
and Wright 1991). Such a government role is common in
MENA countries, where since ancient times, leaders have
recognized the state’s responsibility to ensure adequate
domestic availability of staple foods, and have used public
stocks of grain to this end.
Traditional price-stabilization policies
International agreements involving commodities (includ-
ing rubber, cocoa and tin) have often combined an
acquisition price at which the commodity is purchased
from the market and stored, with a higher ‘ceiling’ or
‘release’ price, at which stocks are made available for
sale by the stabilization authority. This is called a ‘price
band’ scheme. If the ceiling price equals the acquisition
price, this is a simpler ‘price floor’ scheme, keeping the
price at the floor until stocks are sold out, or all cash for
purchases has been expended. In the past, prominent
economists have advocated price stabilization in a band
between floor and ceiling prices to reduce ‘booms and
busts’ typical of commodity prices (Keynes 1942;
Houthakker 1967; Newbery and Stiglitz 1981).
A strong intuition is that such a program maintains price
around the middle of the band if the band is judiciously
chosen; however, advances in computing and dynamic
8 Above minimum stocks, small additional fractions of stocks are
placed on the market only when the incentive is high, because they are
in relatively inaccessible locations or perform valuable roles in
keeping the system operating efficiently. These stocks are ignored
here, since they have a minor role in determining price volatility
(Bobenrieth et al. 2004).
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programming show this is not true.9 Williams and Wright
(1991) show examples with little probability of price
between the mid-point of the band and the top. Most often,
the market appears to be ‘challenging’ either the floor or the
ceiling price. An enforced price-ceiling discourages pro-
duction and private storage, and increases price volatility
(relative to a market with only private storage) as the latter
approaches the ceiling. However, sales from the public
stockpile at the ceiling markedly reduce the frequency of
even higher prices. Thus, the program poses a tradeoff
involving a much higher probability of price at or near the
ceiling, in exchange for less frequent episodes of even
higher prices.10
A serious consideration for price band schemes is budget
cost. There is an appealing intuition that if the mean of the
floor and ceiling price equals the free-market mean, the
program is ‘self-liquidating’, i.e. financially sustainable, based
on the expectation that net balances should equal zero. It is
also intuited that the summed funds from purchases and sales
after several years of operation should be close to their initial
values. This intuition is, however, inaccurate even for a simple
floor price scheme in a market with linear demand and no
underlying trend. Simulations demonstrate that over the years
the balances of such programs have no tendency to cluster
near zero, and will eventually expend any initial capital limit,
perhaps after accumulating large surpluses. Additionally,
experience since the Second World War has shown that these
programs often fail within a decade or two. Recent failures (e.
g. tin and wool) have shown that the largest and most
catastrophic price effect of these interventions can be a severe
price collapse (Bardsley 1994; Gilbert 1996; Haszler 1988).
When such price stabilization programs fail, public consen-
sus usually blames poor administration, but the fundamental
problem is the appealing, but faulty, intuition about how the
program functions.
Recent proposals for global price stabilization
An international coordinated global food reserve
An international coordinated global food reserve was
recently proposed (von Braun et al. 2009), intended to
reassure importers that exporters would supply them in time
of need. The proposal is sketched as an agreement by
members of a ‘club’ to include members of the G8+5 plus
major grain exporters (e.g. Argentina, Thailand and Viet
Nam), who would commit to holding specified amounts of
public grain reserves in addition to those of the private
sector. The public stores would be used to intervene in the
spot market as directed by a ‘high level technical
commission’ with full decision-making authority, and
appointed by the club on a permanent basis. This proposal
has some features common to the current security provi-
sions of the International Energy Agency for dealing with
disruptions in petroleum markets. A major, possibly
insurmountable, challenge for such a commitment-
reinforcing program is ensuring the participants honor their
Fig. 7 World stocks-to-use ratio
and world price index for wheat.
Sources: USDA for
stocks-to-use ratio, World Bank
for price index (calendar year
average of monthly figures
reported for US No. 2 Hard
Winter Wheat, fob at US Gulf
ports)
9 Modeling the dynamic equilibria of storable commodity markets
requires use of numerical techniques for a function that links
equilibrium price to available supply. Simulation of long series of
random harvests is used to characterize the distribution of prices
implied by model parameters. For details, see Williams and Wright
(1991).
10 For an example of projection of the effect of alternative storage
schemes on the probability distribution of prices for a model calibrated
on data from Bangladesh see Brennan (2003).
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obligations and make their stocks available when markets
are under stress. This is a serious issue since the club
members include some exporters whose lack of commit-
ment to their customers was a key factor in recent turmoil
in the global grain trade.
A global virtual reserve
Another related proposal is for a global ‘virtual reserve’.
Nations that are members of the ‘club’ would commit funds
amounting to US$12–20 billion, to be provided by a high-
level technical commission for necessary operations in futures
markets. However, operation of this large program in futures
markets would require ready access to margin financing and
could be subject to gaming by traders aware of the program’s
operating rules. One version of the proposed intervention
characterizes it as a dynamic price-band system (von Braun et
al. 2009) operated by a ‘global intelligence unit’ that also
makes market forecasts and determines when markets are not
functioning well. This unit would be part of an institution
that “already has the long- and medium-term modeling
infrastructure for price forecasting”.
In another interpretation that more closely reflects written
sketches by von Braun and Torero (2008, 2009) and Robles et
al. (2009), the ‘price band’ mentioned appears to be
irrelevant, and the function of the floor price is not
discussed. The ‘virtual reserve’ would apparently adopt no
long positions and hold no stocks in normal times. However,
it would stand ready to take naked short positions (not
backed by stocks or prospective harvests) when a price
surge is detected by a global intelligence unit endowed
with information about the market or special forecasting
powers unavailable to other market participants. The idea
is to arrange access to cash reserves to back these
interventions, which “will reduce spot prices and should
make speculators move out of the market” (von Braun
and Torero 2009).
The intervention is thus designed to reduce levels of stocks
deemed excessive by the global intelligence unit. This is a
puzzling response for addressing recent price spikes which, as
noted, occur only when stocks are at minimum levels relative
to supplies available to the market. Nor is it clear why the
‘global intelligence unit’ would have superior ability to know
when the market is not functioning well. Given the multibil-
lion dollar cost estimated (von Braun and Torero 2009), these
questions and other technical issues (e.g. Wright 2009) must
be answered before these proposals are seriously considered
as policy options.
What impact does food price have on food security?
Discussions of the recent food market crisis have naturally
associated high food prices with food insecurity. However,
too little attention has been paid to the nature and
quantitative relationship between price level and food
insecurity. The analysis has focused on price volatility and
the presence of spikes, often with reference to the short-
term, intra-seasonal volatility of quoted prices.
One problem is that the official statistics on prices, as
used by analysts, provide only partial information on the
conditions of local food markets. Thus, if a daily or weekly
high price is quoted on a mercantile exchange, with no
indication of the volume traded during that period, it is
difficult to assess the implications for food available or the
prices for poor consumers. The high price, especially if the
spike lasts only a few days or weeks, might be associated
with limited transactions in a thin market; for example, as
exporters restricted access to their markets in 2007–2008,
the links between the welfare of their domestic consumers
and prices on global markets were severed. In addition, the
major importers, including most MENA countries, have
long insulated much domestic consumption from global
price volatility, often reducing the mean prices of domestic
consumption below market levels. This indicates the
limitations of inferences relating short-term volatility of
prices to consumer welfare in MENA countries. Policy
makers should consider whether prices should be allowed
to fluctuate with the world market in future periods of
market turmoil. If not, budget exposure, and the possibility
of running out of stocks due to lack of financial resources
or foreclosure of timely access to world markets, are major
concerns.
Price stabilization proposals, as discussed above, focus
on the ‘global market’, that part of the world market for
which prices on the principal grain futures markets are most
relevant. In the recent tumultuous years these prices totally
differed from those faced by most consumers in developing
countries (De Hoyos and Medvedev 2009). For MENA
countries, stabilization of the international price is less
important than, and quite distinct from, local market
stability. Thus the first question for MENA countries to
resolve is the objectives of policies related to stability of
regional grain markets.
Policy objectives of countries in the MENA region
and related instruments
Despite significant reforms, food subsidies are still preva-
lent in MENA countries, and impose a significant fiscal
burden. They generally make larger per capita transfers to
the rich rather than to the poor, giving little reason to
believe that their major objective is to improve welfare of
the poor. One review stated, “The resistance to radical food
policy reform is […] due primarily to the fear of civil unrest
and its subsequent impact on political stability. Past
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experience in the MENA region illustrates the potentially
explosive nature of food price increases (e.g. Tunisia,
Morocco, Egypt, Jordan), substantiating the concerns of
policy makers” (World Bank 1999). If long-standing
policies of subsidizing grain or bread consumption are not
abandoned in the near future, the relevant question changes
from whether MENA governments should intervene, to
how they should optimize their market stabilizing inter-
ventions, given their political constraints.
National strategic reserves
One reason that grain prices have not completely reverted
from recent peaks is that many countries are rebuilding or
expanding their grain reserves in reaction to the export bans
and taxes observed recently.11 Thus, these countries are
indicating that they do not view international futures
markets as reliable substitutes for the local accumulation
of stocks. This is easy to understand for landlocked African
countries which rely on the transport infrastructure of
neighboring countries, and are subject to foreclosure of
crucial trade routes when they are most needed. Futures
contracts eliminate counterparty risk with respect to
performance of the futures contract, including delivery at
the designated delivery point. However, for remote
countries, risks related to other counterparties, including
financiers, agents, transport providers, and neighboring
governments remain very important and often impossible
to hedge. Furthermore a futures market might be shut down
or exports banned by the host country.12
In general, MENA countries are far less remote than
landlocked African countries and are close to major trade
routes. It is difficult to imagine that regional events specific
to grain markets, such as a local export demand surge due
to a drought, could preclude access to imports from afar. A
more likely motivation is concern that political or military
events could cut off market access. For MENA countries
bordering the Persian Gulf, risks include a blockade of the
Straits of Hormuz or other serious military disturbance. For
the citizens of Gaza, closure of market access via Israel is a
familiar hazard. For Egypt and nearby states, closure of the
Suez Canal could also be disruptive to grain imports, at
least in the short term. Many MENA countries may believe
that crises that disrupt their food imports might also
interfere with the flow of oil revenues that fund these
imports, and this double exposure should loom large in
their planning for food and energy security.
A national food reserve is thus an essential element of a
prudent national security policy for many MENA countries.
The key question, then, is the size of the reserve. The answer
must depend on such facts as the diversity of food supplies,
dependability of traditional suppliers, and the cost of the
program. Such stocks tie up capital for the substantial
intervals between releases and can be expensive to maintain
(stocks are ‘rolled over’ with no net release, as required to
maintain quality). Their efficient management also uses scarce
human capital, and temptations for corruption can easily arise.
Two generalizations about MENA countries are impor-
tant for the design of their emergency reserves: their
extraordinary dependence, as a group, on imported grain
for their food supply; and their heavy and continuing
subsidization of the very grains upon which they are so
dependent. The latter suggests that private competitive
storage is likely to be unattractive, even in the absence of
special stabilization measures. Storage is likely to be
dominated by publicly controlled stocks, and perhaps by
unknown quantities held by consumers against disruption
of the public distribution system. The effects of public
stocks on incentives for private commercial storage are
likely to be less salient in the design of a public storage
policy. However, the subsidies encourage excessive con-
sumption of grain products and exacerbate dependence on
their importation.
MENA countries are large importers on the international
scene; however, their aggregate consumption is too small to
require them to pay much attention to the effects of their
policy choices on the international price, except perhaps
with respect to short-term purchasing tactics. Thus, the
national storage activity discussed here is appropriately
directed at a stockpile of a size deemed appropriate to meet
security goals efficiently, relative to alternative policies,
rather than aimed at affecting prices.
The peculiar circumstances of most MENA countries
extend to the nature and attractiveness of major alternatives.
The region is primarily dry, and most countries, especially
around the Gulf, are unpromising candidates for agricultur-
al expansion. Where irrigation is economically feasible, as
in Egypt, the comparative advantage should be in high-
value, labor-intensive agriculture rather than grain produc-
tion. Nevertheless, policy documents of the Arab Economic
Summit and of the Arab Organization for Agricultural
Development (AOAD) still advocate expansion of grain
production to enhance food security.
In this situation, a major benefit of storage as a security
mechanism is to substitute for much more costly efforts to
expand grain production. Saudi Arabia has recognized the
folly of producing grain at a cost five times the prevailing
world price, while depleting its scarce supply of fossil water
12 Both actions were taken in India in 2007 even though the situation
in world grain markets fell far short of emergency conditions; and
even the USA once briefly banned soybean exports in 1973.
11 Recent reports indicate that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, China,
Russia, Jordan, Mozambique, Morocco and Malawi are placing grain
in national reserves (Marc Sadler, personal communication, April
2009).
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and spreading salinity. Storing 1 or 2 years’ supply in its
dry desert climate, though incurring a substantial capital
cost, might be a sustainable and far more economical use of
its resources than its former production regime. Other
MENA countries around the Mediterranean have better
agricultural potential; however, at the margin, many would
be better to turn to larger stockpiles rather than expansion
of grain production to give them the security they seek.
MENA countries not wishing to subsidize a large portion
of food consumption, but seeking to target the most
vulnerable, can design effective policies that encourage
participation of the private sector in their grain markets (see
Wright 2009). Egypt’s policy of making coarse ‘baladi’
bread available at a low fixed price is an example of a self-
targeting strategy which limits leakage of aid to richer
consumers. If public aid is restricted to bread favored only
by the poor, it can leave the rest of the market to the private
sector except in dire emergencies. The public distribution
system can then be a major part of a strategy to ‘roll over’
strategic stocks, keeping them viable, while minimizing the
effects of sales from stocks on the private market.
A regional reserve
To complement national strategic reserves, regionally
coordinated reserves must also be considered. As suggested
earlier, there is potential for smoothing out wheat availabil-
ity in most MENA countries by pooling production;
aggregate regional production is smoother than production
in many individual countries. To the extent that regional
governments can commit to maintain MENA trade access
in cases of rising prices, trade within the region should
stabilize local food markets up to the limits imposed by
trading costs. If the objective is overall market stabilization,
then the only commitment needed by regional government
is not to ban food exports. Unfortunately, some exporters
within the region have not fulfilled this commitment—
when shortages loomed, their own consumers lobbied
successfully to ban or tax exports (e.g. Egypt, Syria, Yemen
and Iraq) (World Bank 2009).
If local shortages are unrelated to global market conditions,
so that the exporter commitment problems are less relevant, a
regional reserve might improve the short-term responses to
local food crises. Such a reserve might alleviate recent
difficulties of lags in food aid responses and mismatches
between years when aid is plentiful and when it is needed.
However, its operation poses many challenges familiar to
administrators of aid programs. The disincentives caused by
the price-depressing effects of food distribution must be
minimized for local farmers and merchants who are always
the first line of defense against famine for countries during
serious food shortages. For example, ensuring that transport is
available to promptly deliver aid may be a problem for
landlocked countries. It seems likely that direct assistance to
the neediest, where feasible, would be more effective than
attempting to reduce prices by supplying extra grain to regular
food markets. Public employment programs for those able to
work have been successful when the reward for work has been
kept low enough to be unattractive to those with other
employment alternatives (Subbarao 2003; Del Ninno et al.
2009).
Logistics considerations
If some MENA countries (e.g. around the Mediterranean) are
confident of access to world grain markets even in emergen-
cies, they can economize by holding lower levels of
precautionary stock. However, for reliable protection against
shortages, they need to ensure that their needy consumers can
receive imported supplies when and where needed. This is
more difficult than it seems. The logistical chain for imports
can look totally different when under delivery pressure.
Stocks moved quickly into ports are useless if ships cannot
be unloaded or supplies moved from port, due to unaccus-
tomed congestion. Under equipment constraints, a normally
comprehensive and economical rail system serving a large
area with many stations can change into a system with few
useable stations, as revealed in a study of the West Australian
wheat market (Brennan et al. 1997). If similar comprehensive
studies of emergency logistics are not available to MENA
countries, they could be advantageous.
Other recent proposals to address price volatility
Besides measures affecting storage activity directly, other
policies might be considered to reduce market volatility and/or
increase market access—some have considerable merit, others
do not, and the following starts with the more promising.
Commitments to divert grains from biofuel and feed uses
in emergencies
Modern food markets are more inherently stable than
their predecessors. Now, an increasing proportion of food
grains and oilseeds is being used for biofuels or for
animal feed. While biofuels production is unlikely to be
high in the MENA region, animal feeding will rapidly
increase as incomes rise. In a food supply emergency, it
should be possible for MENA governments to offer
contracts to animal feeders in their own countries that
commit the latter to divert grains and oilseeds to food use
in specified food market emergencies. Such diversion
should increase food supplies when needed, and has the
additional short-term benefit of increasing the supply of
meat from animals that would otherwise be kept or used
for breeding.
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Investment in foreign agricultural land
This strategy has been pursued mostly by oil-rich Arab
countries (Gulf countries and Libya) to address long-term
food security, while recognizing that self sufficiency is not
an option, and in conditions of growing concern about the
reliability of free international trade. However, after an
initial surge, the rush towards foreign investments in land
seems to be subsiding. The reduction of food prices since
2008, the onset of the financial crisis with associated credit
restrictions,13 and growing concerns about the effects of some
of the announced deals on the welfare of local farmer
communities, led to some deals being either delayed or
abandoned. Nevertheless, there is still strong interest in
investment in foreign land, with Sudan and Pakistan being the
most attractive to Arab investors. Sudan is geographically well-
placed to be a long-term supplier of Gulf countries and Egypt.
Currently, however, Sudan cannot feed its own population, but
would definitely benefit from careful foreign agricultural
investment. The fundamental obstacles to such deals may be
lack of adequate infrastructure and property rights, and
underdeveloped legal systems in the countries involved.
Commitments to refrain from using export restrictions
Recent experience in the rice market has demonstrated the
hazards of reliance on imports to satisfy needs for a staple
commodity. Exporters and importers have a joint interest in
maintaining trade when prices are high, both reaping the full
benefits of the smoothing role of trade, which can exceedwhat
can be achieved via storage. However, commitments of
governments beyond the terms of the current administrations
are difficult to achieve and can easily collapse under pressure
from politically powerful urban consumers. One useful policy
change to improve the commitment capacity of exporters is to
reform WTO disciplines on export bans and taxes consistent
with existing rules against import tariffs and quotas. However,
some observers note that such a discipline would have little
power in an emergency, as WTO sanctions do not apply
retrospectively.
Oil-for-food arrangements
The UAE, presumably capable of offering a logical food-
for-oil deal, could not obtain blanket assurances from
Pakistan not to apply export controls on grain produced
from the UAE’s planned agricultural projects in that
country (Anon. 2009). However, such projects should be
possible as ‘oil for food’ exchanges that increase security of
both parties. Similar deals might induce biofuel-producing
countries to divert grain to human use in emergencies, if
promised compensation of oil from a MENA source.
Conditional trade agreements: food for water
In the context of water-scarce Arab countries, the recent
soaring prices of cereal grains exacerbate problems of water
scarcity—such high prices clearly create incentives to
produce and export irrigated crops.
The case of Syria and Turkey is interesting, where for years
they have been negotiating the distribution of the water flows
of rivers originating in Turkey and flowing through Syria. The
major issue is the Euphrates, on which an agreement exists,
whereby Turkey should guarantee a flow of 500 m3/s at the
Syrian border (Varela-Ortega and Sagardoy 2001, 2003).
Recent droughts, however, have repeatedly revealed incom-
pleteness and weakness in the agreement. When the
Euphrates basin has received less-than average inflows,
especially in summer, Turkey has reduced the water flow to
Syria, claiming the agreement ought to be based on average
annual flow, while Syria maintains that 500 m3/s should be
the minimum guaranteed flow.
Negotiations are proceeding, apparently with no explicit
link ever made with the type and volumes of commodity
trade between the two countries. This situation is interesting
in that water and grain trade agreements could be combined
in a risk-sharing arrangement with mutual advantages for
both countries. The essential elements of one possible
conditional trade agreement are reported in the box below.
By being creative and focusing on the real issues at stake,
mechanisms like the one envisaged would allocate water to
the best user, and will prevent water being ‘wasted’ in
Turkey when it would be socially very valuable in Syria.
Conclusions
The storability of grains causes the price response to a
change in supply to vary with the level of available supply.
The major grains—wheat, rice and maize—are substitutable
in the global market for calories. When their aggregate
supply is high, a modest reduction can be tolerated with a
moderate price increase by drawing on discretionary stocks.
However, when stocks decline to a minimum feasible level,
price becomes much more sensitive to small shocks. In a
free market, high prices may force poor consumers to spend
much of their resources on food and reduce consumption, at
great personal cost. Others reduce consumption very little,
even when prices soar.
In 2007–2008, the aggregate stocks of major grains
carried over from the previous year were at minimal levels
13 At the 5th World Islamic Economic Forum in March 2009, for
example, the Binladin Group decided to delay its plan to invest $4.3
billion in rice production in Indonesia as a result of the global
financial crisis (Smaller and Mann 2009).
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due largely to the substantial mandated diversions of grain
and oilseeds for biofuel and the strong and sustained
increases in income in China and India. Lack of stocks
rendered the markets vulnerable to modest but unpredict-
able disturbances, such as regional weather problems, the
further boost to biofuel demand from the oil price spike in
2007–2008, the unprecedented extension of the Australian
drought, and other production problems. However, supplies
in the market were sufficient to meet food demands without
any price jumps had exporters not panicked, leading to a
cascade of export bans and taxes that cut off importers from
their usual suppliers.
These recent events have, understandably, forced MENA
countries to focus on their vulnerability to the continued
turmoil in grain markets. In deciding the best policies to
adopt, each country must carefully consider its definition of
adequate food security, given its resource endowments and
the tradeoffs from different policy options.
In general, accumulation of stocks is a more effective and
much cheaper strategy than attempting grain self-sufficiency.
Additionally, investment in foreign land for grain
production is unlikely to solve the problem of unreliability
of access to imports in emergencies, manifest in the actions
of many exporters in recent years.
Finally, countries should seriously consider whether a
policy that substantially subsidizes grain consumption, even
for wealthy citizens, and discourages control of waste and
diversification of calorie sources, is worth its price in terms
of budget expense and a greater dependence on foreign
supplies of one or two grains.
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Appendix
Elements of a possible grain-for-water agreement between
Syria and Turkey
The essential elements of a possible conditional trade
agreement between Syria and Turkey are as follows. At the
beginning of the season, Turkey transfers X t of wheat (barley,
sorghum, millet or any combination) to Syria. During the
season, the water flow at the Turkey–Syria border is
monitored. If the flow is reduced below Y m3/s for a total of
N or more days during the season, Syria is entitled to keep
the stock of grains without payment to Turkey. However, if
the flow remains above this minimum, Syria pays Turkey the
average world price of wheat, gross of interests accrued and,
possibly, a risk premium. The wheat transferred from Turkey
to Syria acts as ‘collateral’ paid by Turkey to guarantee Syria
that it will adhere to the agreed minimum flow of water.
Further it ensures that water for wheat production will be
used primarily in the country where that is done most
efficiently. The model assumes that:
(a) in ‘normal’ years, the water released to guarantee the
minimum flow has a zero opportunity cost for Turkey
(the parameter X can always be defined in such a way
that this condition is true);
(b) in ‘normal’ years, and without policy distortions,
Turkey would export and Syria would import wheat
(i.e. it is assumed that Turkey holds a comparative
advantage in wheat production compared to Syria).
The agreement would specify the parameters X, Y and N to
a mutual advantage, which will surely exist, given the
contract structure, given a difference in the marginal value of
water in the two countries. This point is explained in the
following. In normal years, there will be no loss to either
party by maintaining the minimum flow: only establishing a
regular wheat trade from Turkey to Syria. In a drought year,
Turkey might find it convenient to reduce the water below
the minimum guaranteed flow only if the shadow value of
water in wheat production in Turkey is so high as to justify
foregoing the returns on the wheat stock used as ‘collateral’.
If the value of water in Turkey, even in a drought year, is
lower than in Syria, it will be convenient for Turkey to ‘sell’
the marginal water to Syria and not forego the payment for
the collateral wheat. In contrast, if Turkey decides to keep
the water, Syria will have the minimum stocks needed to
guarantee their food security, and procured at minimal cost.
The structure of incentives of such an agreement depends
on the relative value of water in the two countries, and so on
their respective rainfalls. Syria currently uses most of its
water to produce wheat and cotton, and with problems in
current irrigation practices, water consumption is high. Thus,
the amount of wheat-equivalent as a guarantee against the
water deficit might be sensibly lower than what Turkey
might be losing in guaranteeing the agreed minimum flow of
water. Syria will face the risk that the grain price increases
during a drought and yet Turkey fulfills the minimum
guaranteed flow, but this risk could be relatively easily
hedged on global markets by trading wheat futures.
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